3. Advisory TFV-3 (CVE-2017-7563)¶
RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1
06 Apr 2017
v1.3 (since Pull Request #662)
AArch64 BL2, TSP or other users of xlat_tables library executing at AArch64 Secure EL1
Unexpected Privilege Escalation
The translation table library in ARM Trusted Firmware (TF) (under
lib/xlat_tables_v2) provides APIs to help program
translation tables in the MMU. The xlat_tables client specifies its required
memory mappings in the form of
mmap_region structures. Each
has memory attributes represented by the
mmap_attr_t enumeration type. This
contains flags to control data access permissions (
instruction execution permissions (
MT_EXECUTE_NEVER). Thus a
mapping specifying both
MT_EXECUTE_NEVER should result in a
Read-Only (RO), non-executable memory region.
This feature does not work correctly for AArch64 images executing at Secure EL1.
Any memory region mapped as RO will always be executable, regardless of whether
the client specified
The vulnerability is known to affect the BL2 and Test Secure Payload (TSP)
images on platforms that enable the
SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA build option,
which includes all ARM standard platforms, and the upstream Xilinx and NVidia
platforms. The RO data section for these images on these platforms is
unexpectedly executable instead of non-executable. Other platforms or
xlat_tables clients may also be affected.
The vulnerability primarily manifests itself after Pull Request #662. Before
xlat_tables clients could not specify instruction execution
permissions separately to data access permissions. All RO normal memory regions
were implicitly executable. Before Pull Request #662. the vulnerability
would only manifest itself for device memory mapped as RO; use of this mapping
is considered rare, although the upstream QEMU platform uses this mapping when
DEVICE2_BASE build option is used.
Note that one or more separate vulnerabilities are also required to exploit this vulnerability.
The vulnerability is due to incorrect handling of the execute-never bits in the
translation tables. The EL3 translation regime uses a single
XN bit to
determine whether a region is executable. The Secure EL1&0 translation regime
handles 2 Virtual Address (VA) ranges and so uses 2 bits,
xlat_tables library only handles the
XN bit, which maps to
in the Secure EL1&0 regime. As a result, this programs the Secure EL0 execution
permissions but always leaves the memory as executable at Secure EL1.
The vulnerability is mitigated by the following factors:
The xlat_tables library ensures that all Read-Write (RW) memory regions are non-executable by setting the
SCTLR_ELx.WXNbit. This overrides any value of the
PXNbits in the translation tables. See the
sctlr = read_sctlr_el##_el(); \ sctlr |= SCTLR_WXN_BIT | SCTLR_M_BIT; \
AArch32 configurations are unaffected. Here the
XNbit controls execution privileges of the currently executing translation regime, which is the desired behaviour.
ARM TF EL3 code (for example BL1 and BL31) ensures that all non-secure memory mapped into the secure world is non-executable by setting the
SCR_EL3.SIFbit. See the